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Modern history of the Polish nation has been dramatic – the Poles have 
not had statehood for 123 years, were separated, under foreign rule, as well as 
their territory. In the period of the Napoleonic wars, the issue of restoration of 
the Polish state became an object of international politics, and the Polish 
territory, almost swept by a military storm, became a subject of bargaining 
among European countries. In 1815 the Polish territory was divided between 
Russia, Prussia and Austria. 
After the Kingdom of Poland formation in 1815 of, the Polish question 
stood out among the most crucial national problems faced by the Russian 
Empire. Poland was the only one of its suburbs, which had had a long tradition 
of independent statehood and a rich national culture. The position of Poland 
was found to be particular due to a large number of Polish magnates 
(szlachta), the second largest group of the “noble birth” of the Empire after the 
Russian gentry who were mostly employed in the Civil Service. The Polish 
question appeared to become vital among other issues during the rebellions of 
1863–1864 and 1830–1831, which spread over the Polish, Belarusian, 
Lithuanian and Ukrainian lands. The Russian government’s politics was aimed 
at limiting the influence of the Poles on local population in the periods after 
the uprisings. This politics was realized through a number of activities in the 
fields of local self-governing, economics, social live, education and religion. 
These activities can be considered as a specific national politics of the Russian 
government in the Polish, Belarusian and Lithuanian lands. In addition, the 
second half of the XIX century witnessed the formation of national and 
political identities of the Poles. All the above-mentioned identified problems 
make up a part of the concept “The Polish question”. 
The purpose of this article is to study the Polish question within the 
Russian Empire based on the analysis of the latest English-language 
periodicals by scholars of the 1990s – 2000s. 
Short review of the historiography. The Polish question has been more 
than once a special subject for studies throughout Russian history. 
Considerable attention was paid to it by historians from Russia and Poland. 
Schools of Polish and Russian Studies also emerged in Germany, France and 
Austria. The study of G. Eversley “The partitions of Poland” was among the 
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first papers on the Polish history in the ХIХ century, which was published in 
1915 in Great Britain and the United States [4, p. 303–324]. However, the 
landmark of the English-language historiography has changed since 1917. The 
problems of the history of the Russian imperial period remained poorly 
developed in the English literature up to the end of the XX century. More 
attention was paid to the political analysis of the Bolsheviks in power, and the 
history of the Soviet Union. As a result, very large schools on Kremlinology 
were developed in the United States and Canada. 
At the end of the ХХ century, the study of world empires gave new 
impetus to the development of the world historiography. The amount of basic 
research centers grew in number. Thus, during 1998–1999 a “revisionist” five-
volume “The Oxford history of the British Empire” was released. It was 
followed by “The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire”, edited 
by one of the greatest experts on the subject, P.J. Marshall, in 2001. In the 
same year there appeared a thick volume “Empires”, edited by S.J. Olkok. 
After the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the English-language 
historians also turned to the study of the phenomenon of the empire, 
considering the problem of the Soviet Union in this context. Special attention 
was given to the national politics. Historians were interested in the 
comparative analysis of peoples in multinational and multicultural imperial 
formations. Scientists paid special attention to the history of the Poles in the 
Russian Empire. At the end of the last century there appeared several major 
monographs on the subject, including books by C.A. Blackburn “Napoleon 
and the szlachta” (New York 1998), R.E. Blobaum “Rewolucja: Russian 
Poland, 1904–1907” (Ithaca 1995), S.D. Corrsin “Warsaw before the First 
World War: Poles and Jews in the Third City of the Russian Empire, 1880–
1914” (New York 1989), B. Porter “When Nationalism Began to Hate. 
Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-century Poland” (New York 2000) 
and T.R. Weeks “Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia. Nationalism and 
Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914” (Illinois 1996). However, 
many of the conclusions made by American colleagues remain largely 
unknown to the Belarusian historiography. 
For realizing of the project a substantial number of recent scientific 
articles have been studied in journals such as “The Russian Review”, 
“European review of History” and “Ab Imperio”. Though the journal “Ab 
Imperio” is a Russian edition and comes out in Kazan, many English-language 
authors publish their research results on its pages. The total output of the given 
works is up to the requirements of the candidate minimum for a foreign 
language learner. Among the names of the authors, who are specially engaged 
in the study of the Polish question as a national one of the Russian Empire, 
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may be called Th. Weeks, A. Nowak, S. Berger, A. Miller, A. Rieber and 
C. Woolhiser. M. Deflem shows the importance of the use of the comparative 
method in the study of national entities in history [2; 3]. 
All the articles under consideration possess a number of distinctive 
features that differ them from similar Russian works. First of all, the authors 
of these articles not only give the illustration to the problems in a number of 
examples, but make overall conclusions and implications. In other words, the 
induction of thinking is the main logical procedure of the researchers. 
Secondly, most works have the character of reasoning on a given topic; the 
author’s position is clearly expressed in them. Thirdly, the majority of authors 
transfer assessment of the Russian imperial period on the Soviet period, they 
look for similarities and often they find them. This can be explained by the 
orientation of political science, which is characteristic of all of the English-
language historiography. Finally, any problem, especially the national one, is 
looked upon in a wide context of the accompanying circumstances. As a 
result, sometimes originally different events can be connected to each other. 
A. Nowak, who is a Polish historian and Jagiellonian University 
Professor, analyzes the imperial trail in the Polish tradition of self-
identification, identifies its specific manifestations in various ideologies at 
different times in the XIX century [6, p. 266–273]. The researcher concludes 
that the Polish imperial claims were determined by the Polish self-perception 
as a perennial border between East and West. 
Th. Weeks, a professor of the University in California, makes an attempt 
to analyze the reign of Alexander II and his politics on the national question 
including the Polish one [9, p. 225–232]. First according to the author the 
Russian national identity was quite weakly developed in the XIX century. 
Then the author notes that the Poles presented “a headache” for the Russians 
and occupied a special place in the national world of the Empire. Finally, 
according to Th. Weeks the Polish question operated at least on three levels: 
as a direct political threat, as a religious-spiritual threat, and as a threat within 
Slavdom. The historian concludes that the politics of the imperial government 
was based on conflicting considerations and motives: on the one hand, it 
characterized the traditional mechanisms of control over the periphery, and on 
the other hand, it used the modern mechanisms of Russification [10, p. 366–
367]. Th. Weeks also analyses the Government’s politics of the Romanov 
Empire on protecting the Orthodox Russian people and oppressing non-
Russians in the bordering areas between the Russian and Polish 
provinces [8, p. 539–551]. 
S. Berger (Professor of the University of Manchester) and A. Miller (a 
Russian historian and Central European University Professor) do not believe 
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that nation-states challenged empires in the XIX century and ultimately 
brought about their downfall. Instead they argue that nation-states were 
created by empires [1, p. 317–326]. 
C. Woolhiser’s attention (Professor from Harvard University) is drawn to 
the role of boundaries in the formation of the Polish and Belarusian national 
identities. He concludes that the influence of political, social and religious 
identities in the formation of national consciousness of the Poles and 
Belarusians contributed to the complex linguistic picture, which did not 
coincide with the ethnographic picture [11, p. 345]. 
Professor of the University of Pennsylvania A. Rieber analyzes the 
Russian national politics in the context of the reform of the political, economic 
and social systems of the Russian Empire [7, p 331–335].The researcher 
focuses on the periodical press and literature in the process of promoting the 
ideas of imperialism. He also points to the clash of the Polish and Russian 
imperialism in the Belarusian-Lithuanian provinces. 
Thus, the short review of the literature used for writing the article shows 
that the Polish question is closely connected with the problems of national 
politics in the Empire and the formation of national identities in 
historiography. Historians also devote considerable attention to the position of 
the borders of the Empire. The Belarusians are also considered in the context 
of the borders between East and West. We think that historians are absolutely 
right in defining the role of Russia in the formation of the Polish political and 
national identities. However, many of their assessments are subjective and 
they need to be specified. 
The Poles: the place and role in the Russian Empire. The position of 
the Kingdom of Poland in the Russian Empire was complex and polysemantic. 
On the one hand, the Russian government has sought to include the Polish 
territory into a single imperial system. The government implemented 
mechanisms to unify it. On the other hand, the Russians could not ignore the 
Polish experience of self-state of the existence and features of the national 
character. Therefore, the government pursued a cautious politics, which was 
aimed at curbing the influence of the Poles to other nations that were part of 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  
The Poles occupied a special place in the national world of imperial 
Russia for several reasons, foremost among these, simple numbers, geography, 
history, culture, and religion. Using imperial Russia’s method of calculating 
nationality, the Poles made up the largest non-Russians ethnicity in the 
Empire. This inherently hostile national group, furthermore, lived in the 
geopolitically vital borderlands between Russia and Central Europe. Unlike 
most other minority nationalities, the Poles could look back on a long and 
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distinguished history, a fact of no little import in the historically obsessed XIX 
century. Besides political strength, the historical existence of a Polish court 
and Polish nobility meant that, again unlike the Lithuanians or Kazakhs, the 
Poles could boast of a sophisticated European high culture which, for all their 
criticisms, Russians respected. Moreover, from at latest the early XVII 
century, the history of Polish-Russian relations were consistently hostile [5, p. 
225]. All of these factors – religion, culture, history, geography, and numbers 
– continued to make the Polish question sui generis among the nationality 
“headaches” of the Russian Empire to its very demise.  
The Russian public, for the most part, treated the Poles with hostility 
there was a reason for this. Emperor Alexander I tried to keep the Congress 
Kingdom of Poland not only as a valuable strategic outpost of Russia’s 
influences in central Europe, but also as a kind of testing ground, where he 
tried new techniques and possibilities to reform his state in order to bring it 
closer to western standards. The fact that the tsar granted Poland a liberal 
constitution, while Russia still had none (actually she would have to wait for 
her own liberal constitution for almost 180 years) illustrates this situation. The 
Russian westernized elite took it as an offence, an affront to the victorious 
generation of 1812 war heroes, the future “Decembrists”. As a result, Russian 
always treated with suspicion and charity to the Poles throughout the XIX – 
beginning XX centuries. 
N. Karamzin expressed for the first time a vision of the mortal combat 
between the Russian and Polish cultural-political cores over the lands of the 
former Kievan Rus’ and domination in the whole Eastern Europe. His harsh 
verdict meant that it was a zero sum game [4, p. 267].  
M. Murav’ev was also no liberal in any sense of the word, and certainly 
he regarded the Poles (in particular the “szlachta” and the Roman Catholic 
clergy) as inveterate enemies of all things Russian [5, p. 226]. From his own 
point of view, however, Murav’ev was no simple brute but a defender of 
Russian state interests and of the Russian “simple folk” whose economic and 
national interests were held in thrall by haughty and repressive of the Poles. 
Consequently, during the 1863 rebellion (for Murav’ev and his supporters 
always “mutiny”),  
M. Katkov accused the Poles of attempting to resurrect the borders of 
1772 and reestablish Polish domination over western Russia. In so doing, the 
Poles betrayed their responsibilities as subjects of the Tsar and as members of 
the Russian nobility. M. Katkov called for a nationalization or, to put it 
another way, russification of the noble estate throughout the Russian 
Empire [5, p. 228]. 
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Thus, the imperial elites were trying not only to limit the impact of 
separatist nationalism and political modernization, but also to use these new 
trends to strengthen empires [10, p. 331–333]. They thought of themselves, 
primarily, as defenders of “Russianness” in that highly contested area. 
Nevertheless, after 1863, when great effort was expended to bring the 
Kingdom of Poland more in line with general administrative practices in the 
empire, it retained its own legal system, mortgage laws, and censorship 
regulations [6, p. 366]. 
In the Kingdom of Poland that was not claimed as national territory, the 
Russian government was usually satisfied with a certain level of acculturation, 
which was necessary for the functioning of the modernizing state machine? 
Key institutions of the Russian Empires (army, law courts, bureaucracies, and 
universities) were staffed by peripheral elites keen to take material advantage 
of the promised integration of this area. For examples, in the Romanov Empire 
the officer corps proved to be the most efficient tool not only for the 
acculturation and consolidation of the imperial elite but later also for the 
Russification of Polish nobility [8, p. 322]. At the same time, the Russian had 
to fight hard to prevent local nationalism activists from using these tools for 
their rival purposes. 
One of the latter was the evolution of confessional politics toward the 
Roman Catholic Church. In the context of the Polish-Russian confrontation, 
catholic clerics came to be viewed as leaders of the Polish national movement. 
The equation of Catholicism with “Polonism” became by the mid-1860s quite 
commonplace in official documents, periodicals, private correspondence. 
Instead of disciplining and therefore delegitimizing the Catholic religiosity, 
the officials launched what was in fact a campaign of denigration of Catholic 
faith. It included, among other measures, political persecution of Catholic 
clergy and mass conversions of the rural Catholic population to Orthodoxy 
(driven by offers of material incentives and benefits) [7, p. 543–545]. 
Actually, a considerable majority of clergy stood loyal to the imperial 
authorities and preached obedience; those who shared in thinking about 
national independence, had their own (apolitical and inspired by Catholic 
theology) vision of how to attain this goal. However, the imperial mythology 
presented Catholic clergymen as one of the most perilous enemies and 
oppressed them out of proportion to their actual involvement in the national 
movement.  
Thus, the Poles were perceived internal enemies (or rivals) in the Russian 
Empire. This point of view was typical of both the Russian government and 
the public opinion. The activities of the Poles threatened the position of the 
Orthodox Church (especially in the Belarusian-Lithuanian provinces), and 
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Russian imperial interests in East-Central Europe. In addition, the unresolved 
conflict with the Poles undermined the position of the Russian as defenders in 
the Slavic world. 
The Polish national ideology: the main directions in the XIX – 
beginning of the XX century. One of the most pressing issues is the question: 
how did the Polish elites of the Commonwealth transform themselves into 
pioneers of modern nation building and the “awakening” of other East 
European nations? It is necessary to stress here the importance of the specific 
ideology coined during the Romantic era, following the first great uprising of 
1830. However, all of Polish history and culture was infused with the equating 
of szlachta with nation, and a complete neglect of and contempt for the 
peasant masses [5, p. 229]. Actually, it was not a modern ethnic nation-state 
ideology, but, on the contrary, a new faith in the binding capacities of the 
Commonwealth. Beaten in the field, the old Republic should have its spiritual 
revenge over Russian and all other despotisms. 
New ideology was presented in the post-insurrection emigration by the 
most-talented Polish poets, such as A. Mickiewicz, J. Slowacki, and their 
teacher-historian from Wilno University, J. Lelewel [4, p. 268]. All of them 
represented the Grand Duchy of Lithuania’s historical traditions. All of them 
stressed the importance of a voluntary union as a principle of the 
Commonwealth’s political system. All of them extolled the unique character 
of the Commonwealth’s republican virtues and the rights and liberties of its 
citizens as opposed not only to the Russian political traditions, but to Western 
European bureaucratic formalism and state absolutism in different guises. 
In A. Mickiewicz’s and J. Slowacki’s messianic-religious interpretation, 
Poland became the nation-martyr and even the Christ of nations. All the 
struggles for Polish independence, consecutive insurrections from the Bar 
confederation through the Kosciuszko uprising to the 1830–1831 war with 
Russia were interpreted as models of a courageous consistency in striving for 
freedom. J. Lelewel coined the tenet used during the uprising of 1830–1831 
and repeated subsequently by the émigrés as the new motto of the Polish 
mission, “For your freedom and ours”. Indeed, the Polish émigrés were active 
and very much visible in all of Europe’s political turmoil between 1831 and 
1863. The Revolutions of 1848–1849, known as the Spring of Nations, was 
the climax of this revolutionary Polish activity. 
For J. Lelewel and A. Mickiewicz, any geopolitical considerations were 
alien. They sternly believed in the attractive force of an ethic appeal connected 
to the example of the Polish fight against the Tsarist arch-Empire and 
extended this belief to the Russian nation as well, which they treated as one of 
the victims rather than the perpetrator of imperial and despotic designs.  
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In other versions of Polish émigré political thought, however, the Polish 
“liberation doctrine” was more geopolitically oriented, distinctly opposing 
Poland and Russia as two opposing the Poles of political attraction in Eastern 
Europe and in Slavdom in general, not only in terms of idealistic principles, 
but also in the harsh reality of state-interests [4, p. 270]. Poland, reconstituted 
in its old, pre-partitioned borders, would form a kind of anti-Russian strategic 
magnet. In order to secure the future place of Poland, its aim should not be so 
much to create a Polish Empire as to destroy the existing Russian Empire and 
diversify its geopolitical territory into as many component-states as possible.  
More illustrative in this respect may be the last stage of Prince 
Adam Czartoryski’s political career. The former Tsarist foreign minister 
became the prime minister of the Polish insurgent government in 1831 and 
ended up the most implacable enemy of the Russian Empire’s territorial 
integrity. For thirty years, he led the propaganda and diplomatic fight against 
the Tsarist state from his émigré headquarters in Paris. The failure of the idea 
of a just empire, an idea he had cherished during his service at Alexander I’s 
court, developed into a highly original concept of nations and their rights to 
independence, which was to take priority over imperial states in organizing a 
new political order in Europe [4, p. 271]. He expressed this new idea in his 
extensive “Essay on Diplomacy”, written in 1823 and printed in 1830, and 
then tried to realize it against the Russian Empire. Leading the post-
insurrection diplomacy and propaganda of Polish exiles for thirty years, Prince 
A. Czartoryski became the main patron of all non-ethnically Russian elements 
of the Empire with the aim of tearing the empire apart. His battle cry against 
Tsar Nicholas I’s state was independence for the Don Cossacks, the Tatars, the 
Circassians (that is Chechens), Finns, Estonians and other ethnic or religious 
minorities. 
Actually A. Czartoryski himself was the main financial and political 
patron of the group of émigrés that tried to defend the old unity of the 
Commonwealth as a multiethnic, multi-religious, and even multilingual entity 
founded on common republican virtues and on the belief in the revival of the 
old Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian power in its pre-partition frontiers. They even 
established a particular organization in Paris at the end of 1831, The Society 
of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian Territories. It had one of A. Czartoryski’s 
associates as its president, A. Mickiewicz as vice-president, J. Slowacki as 
treasurer, and J. Lelewel as head of the historical section. The Society’s aim 
was to propagate the unity of the Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands with Poland 
and the specific historical and political traditions that differed them from 
Russia. 
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After the defeat of the national uprisings 1830–1831 and 1863–1864 the 
early modern conception of a republican nation began to be replaced by the 
modern concept of the nation as the sum of vernacular speakers, a necessary 
precondition for modern democracy as it seemed. So they (especially 
T. Krepowiecki and A. Gurowski) criticized the concept of the old supra-
ethnic Commonwealth as a destructive and anarchic one. Any “regionalism”, 
such as the cultivation of a separate Ruthenian (Ukrainian) or Lithuanian 
cultures and languages, should be strictly forbidden. The eastern half of the 
former Commonwealth should simple adopt Polishness [4, p. 272]. 
Another attack on traditional ideas of the Commonwealth originated from 
the political thinker M. Mochnacki, who criticized the “international” 
character of the obligations taken by A. Mickiewicz or J. Lelewel in their 
concept of Romantic nationalism. The Poles should spare their blood for the 
Polish cause only. Any solidarity of nations is just dangerous chimera. 
M. Mochnacki and T. Krepowiecki, in their concurrent critique of Romantic 
sense of mission, foreshadowed a crisis in the concept of the Commonwealth’s 
regeneration and of its “liberation mission” in Eastern and Central Europe. 
They intellectually paved the way for modern nationalists not only in Poland, 
but in Lithuania and Ukraine as well. 
The very fundamental characteristics of the Romantic-republican 
ideology of a future Polish state as the cultural and political center for a large 
part of Eastern and Central Europe were undermined from within. It provoked 
another wave of criticism of the Romantic idea of Poland, this time formulated 
on the right wing of the Polish intellectual life by conservative historians in 
Krakow (J. Szujski and M. Bobrzynski) [4, p. 273]. They were closer rather to 
A. Mickiewicz than to modern nationalists in their concept of a tolerant, 
multiethnic polity. However, they were radically vehement in their assault on 
the Romantic Sarmatian belief in any specific virtues of the old Polish 
Commonwealth’s political culture and civilization. Just like the Enlightenment 
philosophers a century before, Krakow’s historical school renewed a 
perception of Poland as a retrograde country that should be civilized by 
Western European standards and should change radically its political 
“anarchic” tradition to those represented by such centralized states as Prussia 
or France. 
Thus, the Polish national ideology was aimed at reviving the Polish state. 
It has gone a few stages from the Republican conception to the modern- or 
post-nationalist conservative type. They dealt another blow to the “imperial” 
belief of the old Sarmatianists and the XIX century Romantics that Poland 
could be an independent political leader in the whole of Eastern Europe and 
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that it could be a leader in the strategically vital region, independent both from 
Russia and united Germany. 
Belarusian-Lithuanian provinces: the particular situation between 
the Russian and Polish national identities. Following the Partitions of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in 1771–1795, most of its East regions 
were ceded to the Russian Empire, including Belarusian-Lithuanian provinces. 
While the Tsarist authorities initially did little to counter Polish linguistic and 
cultural influence in the Belarusian lands, the anti-Russian uprisings in Poland 
and Lithuania of 1830–1831 and 1863–1864 led to increasingly draconian 
measures on the part of the authorities to russify the annexed territories. In 
1839 the Uniate Church (to which up to 80% of the Belarusian peasantry had 
belonged since the XVII century) was forcibly merged with the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and in 1840 Polish was replaced by Russian as the official 
language of the region. 
For a long while, western borderlands of the Russian Empire were 
associated in imperial officials’ minds with Polish culture and language. 
During the first half of the XIX century, despite Nicholas I’s attempts at 
establishing (especially after the Polish uprising of 1830–1831) a unified 
Russian-language administration, court and education in the western 
provinces, the latter remained predominantly Polish on the mental maps of the 
ruling elite itself. In essence, a kind of alliance between the imperial state and 
Polish nobility was preserved. It was until the early 1860s that such a state of 
things radically changed. Analysis of geopolitical perceptions of the imperial 
elite in the era of the partitions of Poland shows the complexity of the task 
bureaucrats-Russifiers were facing in the Western provinces in the 1860s. 
While previously official St. Petersburg had generally ignored the 
existence of the Belarusians as a distinct ethnic group, maintaining that the 
population of the so-called “Northwestern Territory” was predominantly 
Polish as a concession to the Polish-oriented elites of the region, it now 
maintained that the majority of the population were in fact Russian, albeit 
corrupted by insidious Polish Catholic influences [9, p. 303]. To strengthen 
the Russian cultural and linguistic presence in the region, Roman Catholic 
Belarusians were forcibly converted to Russian Orthodoxy and the use of both 
Polish and Belarusian in education and the cultural sphere was prohibited. The 
Polish question represented Russia’s “sore spot” because it forced Russians to 
act in contradiction with their fundamental national values. Russians were by 
nature tolerant, and yet they were forced by circumstances (and by faults in 
the Polish national character) to retain a tight grip not only on the Russian 
Western provinces, but even on the Kingdom of Poland [5, p. 232]. 
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An important part of the elites of the Commonwealth had not been 
satisfied with the situation where the Kingdom of Poland was separated from 
the western provinces, the eastern half of the former Commonwealth. They 
had already been on the path that led – through modernization – to a new, 
national reconstruction of their identity with the idea of state independence as 
a natural consequence and guarantor of it. Notwithstanding the fact that 
another and still quite substantial part of the former Commonwealth’s gentry 
(the ethnic Poles included) saw nothing bad or compromising in serving the 
Empire and pursuing their personal careers in the Tsarist administration and 
army, they were actually trapped between the independence-minded Polish 
groups and the Russian national reaction. The spiral of recriminations and 
aggression on both sides of the conflict confounded the imperial logic of the 
Tsarist state. The Poles (equated in the traditional, still officially pre-national 
system, with Catholics) began to be excluded from the Empire’s elite just 
because they were the Poles. This meant the beginning of the “nationalization” 
of the Empire that finally led to its destruction [4, p. 267–268]. Two Polish 
uprisings of 1830–1831 and 1863–1864, and corresponding Russian national 
reactions to them were milestones in this process of destruction. 
The Russian politics in the region after 1863 was torn by contradictions; 
on the one hand, it was maintained that the local peasantry, both Catholic and 
Orthodox, was on the whole loyal to the Tsar, and thereby constituted a 
bulwark of the state; at the same time, the identification of “Catholic” with 
“Polish” meant that many Belarusian-speaking Catholic peasants were 
subjected to the same restrictions as Polish gentry (limitations on the purchase 
of land, etc.). The question of the use of Russian or even Belarusian in 
Catholic churches divided Russian officialdom: some supported the idea as the 
most effective means to bring about linguistic and cultural Russification 
among the Belarusian-speaking Catholics, with the ultimate goal of converting 
them to Orthodoxy. Others expressed the concern that replacing Polish with 
Russian would permit the formation of a sizeable Russian Catholic 
community, which would inevitably demand equal rights, thereby 
strengthening the position of Catholicism in Russia. 
The negative side of the program of national politics is easily guessed: 
land settlements very unfavorable to the landowning class, followed by a 
complete prohibition on the Poles from purchasing land in the region, 
repressions and restrictions on the Catholic Church and clergy, and 
proscriptions on many aspects of Polish culture. This politics against the 
Polish landowners and Catholic clergymen was explained by the belief that 
only a hard line would succeed in dispelling the Poles’ illusions and 
pretensions toward this “eternally-Russian land”. Accordingly the Russian 
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aspired to increase the numbers of schools there, improve the financial 
situation of the local Orthodox churches and clergy, keep the Poles out of 
government posts, and watch carefully over the activities of the Catholic 
clergy. 
Moreover, imperial elite often supported what they thought to be weaker 
local nationalisms in order to neutralize claims to contested territories from 
alternative powerful expansionist projects. In the western borderlands of the 
Romanov empire the authorities for a certain period supported Lithuanian, 
Latvian and Estonian nationalisms in the hope of undermining challenges 
from Polish and, since 1866/1870, German nationalisms, which claimed 
respectively the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Baltic 
provinces [8, p. 321]. Nevertheless, through forced conversions in Orthodox, 
the Tsarist authorities unwittingly furthered the identification of Catholicism 
with Polish national identity in the Belarusian-Lithuanian region, since at the 
time only the Polish national cause offered a clearly articulated defensive 
ideology in the face of the regime’s anti-Catholic politics [9, p. 304]. 
The growth of divergent national identities among the rural population of 
this region, in particular the gradual transformation of Belarusian-speaking 
peasants of the “Polish faith” into “Poles”, was thus indirectly a product of 
Tsarist Russian nationalities politics. While the Orthodox (including the 
formerly Uniate majority) were identified as Russians, at the local level this 
term continued to be associated primarily with confessional, rather than 
national identity [7, p. 539–540]. 
Despite intensified Russification politics after 1863, the linguistic 
character of the region, particularly outside of the cities, remained largely the 
same [9, p. 305]. Native speakers of Russian, increasingly numerous by the 
beginning of the XX century, were to be found primarily among military 
personnel, government officials, white-collar workers and professionals, 
Orthodox clergy, and some of the landowners who had been granted lands 
confiscated from Polish participants in the Uprising of 1863. Native Polish 
speakers were found primarily in the towns (mainly among the intelligentsia) 
and on the estates, among the Catholic clergy, and in some rural szlachta 
settlements. Officially Belarusian language was regarded as a dialect of a 
single Russian language, along with Great Russian and Little Russian, in other 
way Ukrainian. 
Thus, after 1863 religion was increasingly intertwined with nationality 
and even subsumed into it. And yet, despite efforts by some Russian officials 
to encourage conversion in an effort to strengthen the Russian position (either 
imperial or national) here in the end this activism was of short duration and 
had fairly limited consequences [6, p. 368]. The most acute religious issue, as 
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synonymous with national, came to the fore in the late of the XIX – early of 
the XX century, when the Uniate Church was eliminated in the Kingdom of 
Poland and the Uniates converted to Orthodoxy. 
Conclusion. It is by now a truism that the Russian Empire was a multi-
national state that should not be studied or researched as if it was simply 
“Russia.” Recent English-language historiography has challenged a broadly 
accepted perspective on the relations between empires and nationalism. We 
used to think that the nation-state formation in Europe (particularly East-
Central Europe) was invariably undermining empires and that imperial elites 
were doing their best to block nation-building processes. This abstract is based 
on the assumption that empires played much more complex roles in the 
process of shaping nation-states, that it is more productive to think that 
imperial elites actively participated in nation-building in the core areas of 
empire and sometimes also in their peripheries, and that nation-building was 
not only a challenge for empires but also part of their survival strategy in the 
new modern setting. That is not to say, of course, that in contiguous empires 
all the peripheral regions were targets of a concerted strategy to include them 
in the nationalising core. 
Nationalist historical narratives were constructed in order to “prove” 
conclusively the belonging of diverse imperial spaces to the “national 
territory”. In the western borderlands of the Romanov Empire the Russian 
national historical narrative was used to claim the eastern borderlands of the 
partitioned Polish Commonwealth as Russian national territory on the grounds 
that both the medieval Kievan Rus’ and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were 
Russian states. Nationalist historical narratives had a trickle-down effect on 
school curricula, which were rewritten in order to facilitate the nationalisation 
of imperial space. In Russia the author of an important national narrative, N. 
Ustrialov, was awarded the prize for the best textbook in history as early as the 
1830s. 
During the 1860s and later, the Northwestern region was the area of the 
most intense Polish-Russian rivalry, the bitterest clash of the Russian and 
Polish nation-building projects. Contention with the Polish presence was not 
simply military struggles, oppression, reprisals, and persecutions of those 
whom the government considered irreconcilable rebels or incorrigible 
separatists. Such contention also included a good deal of sophisticated cultural 
and semiotic legitimization of imperial power, resourceful myth-making and 
representational strategizing. 
The whole campaign of Russification was intended to reassert the 
“Russianness” of the Western provinces (as distinct from the Kingdom of 
Poland). However, this type of discourse threatened to undermine the 
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traditional foundations and mechanics of the Romanov Empire. To justify 
their anti-elitism and harsh measures against the Kingdom of Poland and 
Western provinces, the imperial authorities had to perpetuate the extralegal 
order of administration there. 
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